I. Overview

Context
The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) was conceptualized in 1997 during an effort by the US Government to create a "private, non-profit corporation … to assume responsibility for the technical management of the Internet Domain Name and IP addressing systems." 1 At the time, ICANN's creators envisioned an organization that would support the development of "sound, fair, and widely accepted policies" for the management of the Domain Name System (DNS) that also reflect the input of the international community of Internet users. In 1998, ICANN was formally established as a California non-profit, public benefit corporation and was recognized by the US Department of Commerce. Since its creation, ICANN has been the primary entity responsible for managing decisions and policies relating to the DNS.
As many observers have noted, ICANN's internal structure draws on multiple institutional models. 2 Bound by fiduciary duties, under the governance of a Board of Directors, and subject to the California Corporate Code and the US court system, ICANN undoubtedly has certain characteristics of a traditional private-sector actor. It is 
II. An Introduction to ICANN 1. ICANN's Organizational Structure
Decisions made by ICANN affect Internet stakeholders around the world. The framework in which these decisions are made is quite unique. Although ICANN is a non-profit corporation in California, ICANN is also a bottom-up, consensus-based organization that represents global interests. As a result of these characteristics, ICANN has developed a very specific organizational structure which makes it difficult to apply the traditional best practice rules usually employed in the field of corporate governance.
ICANN's Board of Directors consists of sixteen individual "Directors" with voting power and five non-voting "liaisons." 5 The Directors are responsible for exercising ICANN's powers and managing ICANN's property and business affairs. 6 The Board may only take official action, on behalf of ICANN, by a majority vote of all the Directors, or, in limited circumstances, by a majority of the Directors present at a meeting of the Board. 7 Accordingly, 473 much of ICANN's organizational structure is arranged to facilitate informational channels between the ICANN's Advisory Committees and Supporting Organizations and the Board of Directors. 5 The Nominating Committee directly selects approximately one half (8 individuals) of the Directors on the Board. The Address Supporting Organization, the Country Codes Supporting Organization, and the Generic Names Supporting Organization select 2 Directors, each (for a total of 6 individuals). The At-Large Community selects one Director to the Board. Finally, the remaining Board seat is occupied by ICANN's President/CEO. See generally, ICANN Bylaws, Article VI. Section 1, 2. The five "Liasons to the Board" are appointed by ICANN's Advisory Committees (the Secuirty and Stability, the Governmental, and the Root Server, ACs), the Technical Liason Group, and the Internet Engineering Task Force -each constituency appoints one Liason. ICANN Bylaws, Article VI, Section 9. Though the liaisons do not vote on matters pending before the Board, they are "entitled to attend Board meetings, participate in Board discussions and deliberations and have access to … materials provided to the Directors for use [by the Board]." ICANN Bylaws, Article VI, Section 9, ¶5. 6 ICANN Bylaws, Article II, Section 1. 7 ICANN Bylaws, Article II, Section 1. If the ICANN Board is considering any policies for adoption that "substantially affect the operation of the Internet or third parties, including the imposition of fees or charges", the Board must obtain a vote that represents the majority of all Directors. ICANN Bylaws, Article II, Section 1; Article III, Section 6. For "all other matters", expect those specificially provided for in the Bylaws, "the Board may act by majority vote of those present at any annual, regular, or special meeting of the Board … where a quorum is present." ICANN Bylaws, Article II, Section 1.
As is outlined in the chart above, ICANN's organizational structure is comprised of eleven constituent bodies which can be divided into different groups: 8 The Nominating Committee is responsible for selecting eight members of the Board of Directors. 9 The Nominating Committee consists of twenty-three members; seventeen voting members and six non-voting members. All members are appointed or selected by other ICANN bodies. 10 There are three "Supporting Organizations": the Address Supporting Organization advises the Board with respect to policy issues relating to the operation, assignment and management of Internet addresses. 11 The Country-Code Names Supporting Organization is responsible for developing and recommending global policies relating to country-code top-level domains (e.g., ".us" or ".uk"); 12 and, the Generic Names Supporting Organization fulfills the corresponding tasks with regard to generic toplevel domains (e.g., ".com" or ".org"). 13 
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The Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC) consists of representatives from a large number of national governments from all over the world. The GAC provides advice to the Board on the activities of ICANN as they relate to concerns of governments, in particular where ICANN's policies or proposals may interact with national laws, international agreements or public policy. 14 The At-Large Advisory Committee (ALAC) considers and provides advice on the activities of ICANN, insofar as they relate to the interests of individual Internet users around the world. 15 The Committee consists of five members selected by the Nominating Committee and two members selected by each of the Regional At-Large Organizations (RALOs). 16 The latter serve as the main forum and coordination points for public input to ICANN from their respective geographic regions. 17 The ALAC and the RALOs ensure that a broad set of individual Internet users' interests are involved and represented in ICANN.
Two additional Advisory Committees deal with technical issues: the Security and Stability Advisory Committee provides advice on matters relating to the security and the integrity of the Internet's naming and address allocation system. 18 The Root Server System Advisory Committee advises the Board on the operation of the root name servers that execute the necessary functions to establish the domain name system and to ensure a stable and secure Internet. 19 The Technical Liaison Group connects the ICANN Board with sources of information concerning the technical standards that underlie ICANN's activities. 20 This group consists of four international organizations which are active in the field of standardization. 21 In addition, the Internet Engineering Task Force is an organization open to any participant interested in improving the Internet's technical standards (i.e., normative specifications). 22 Finally, the Ombudsman acts as a neutral dispute resolution practitioner by providing an independent internal evaluation of complaints raised by 475 members of the ICANN community about unfair or inappropriate treatment, namely by the Board or one of the other constituent bodies. 23 Together with the ICANN CEO/President, each of the eleven constituent groups feed inputs into the Board, either by right to elect members to a Board seat, or through a non-voting liasion. The Board holds regular meetings three times per calendar year. 24 In between regular meetings, the Board also holds "special meetings," which are convened at the request or approval of "onequarter (¼) of the members of the Board or by the Chairman of the Board or the President." 25 So long as a quorum is present, the Board may take official actions on behalf of ICANN at either regular or special meetings after a majority vote of all Directors is cast. In some limited circumstances, where a proposal being considered for adoption does not "substantially affect the operation of the Internet or third parties," a majority vote of members present at a meeting is sufficient for Board action on a proposal. 26
A Summary of the Central Critiques of ICANN Decision-Making Processes
As noted in Section I, ICANN has engaged in numerous efforts in recent years to analyze and enhance the legitimacy of the decision-making processes that course through this complex structure, including the recently completed review process mandated by the AoC. 27 The ATRT was charged with assessing three aspects of ICANN's current approach to accountability, including transparency, public participation and Board governance. This analysis was supplemented by an independent study (the Berkman report) undertaken by selected faculty and researchers at the Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University (the Berkman team). 28 Three of the authors of this contribution have been heavily involved in Berkman's independent review effort.
The ATRT and the Berkman team utilized distinct methodologies and analytical tools. To organize its review, the ATRT established four working groups composed of ATRT members, each analyzing specific topical areas of review, as identified in the AoC, including: (1) the governance, performance, and composition of the ICANN Board; (2) the role and effectiveness of the GAC and its interaction with the Board; (3) public input processes and the policy development process; and (4) review mechanism(s) for Board decisions. 29 476
Each working group examined materials that were relevant to their area of inquiry, including ICANN bylaws, policies, procedures, etc.; analyzed public comments and inputs from the community; conducted interviews and analyzed relevant data; and consulted directly with the broader ICANN community. The ATRT also noted current ICANN activities that are underway to meet ongoing AoC commitments.
The Berkman team combined a number of qualitative research methods into its approach. Efforts included, among other things, primary research, such as various structured (questionnaire-based) interviews with experts and stakeholder representatives, secondary research of extensive Web and database searches, an exploratory English-language literature review, and the drafting of case studies. 30 The Berkman team also conducted a review of a diverse range of publicly available materials, including public comments, ICANN documents and policies, institutional reports, academic studies, media reports, and expert opinions. It also took account of other current ICANN initiatives related to AoC commitments.
While there is variation in the manner in which each report conceptualizes and organizes its analysis (and therefore in how that analysis informs each set of recommendations), it is possible to summarize key criticisms related to ICANN's decision-making processes in the following ways: 27 The ATRT submitted its final recommendations to the Board on December 31, 2010. ICANN "ATRT Final Recommendations", December 31, 2010, http://www.icann.org/en/reviews/affirmation/atrt-final-recommendations-31dec10-en.pdf. 28 The independent recommendations were limited to the scope of activities described in paragraph 9.1 of the AoC. 
Analyzing these Critiques via an Information Law Approach
The findings of the Berkman report and those of the ATRT demonstrate the value of applying different analytical tools and research methodologies to better understand the very complex landscape of ICANN decision-making processes. As demonstrated by the high-level summary above, both approaches provide generalizable findings concerning each of the focal points identified in the AoC. Their slightly different conceptual frameworks also result in distinctly formulated recommendations, some of which are aimed at structural improvements (i.e., those aimed at issues linked to ICANN's organizational mission and identity, including its legal structures, its organizational structure, the role of the different constituencies and supporting organizations, and its Bylaws) and others suggested on procedural enhancements (i.e., those related to procedures within a given institutional framework, including for example, the clarity, timeliness, or predictability of decisions, when and how information flows through an organizational framework, etc. In this paper, we apply a third methodology to some of the transparency challenges that ICANN faces via an Information Law approach. This framework uses three overlapping modes of analysis to evaluate ICANN's information-related activities, including:
Normative Analysis: which analyzes an organizations's normative policies against aggregated normative standards in a comparable environment.
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This analysis seeks to identify contradictions between aggregated environment practices and organization-specific policies or commitments.
Normative Synthesis: which generally evaluates the organization's normative policies. This analysis seeks to identify where provisions within normative polices can be modified to improve overall information distribution and quality.
Compliance Analysis: which analyzes an organization's normative policies against its actual practices. This analysis seeks to identify disparities between commitments and practices.
Analyzing these three layers enables us to have a more nuanced understanding of the role of information-handling norms, practices and policies, which have implications for the success -and legimitimacy -of ICANN's approaches to public participation, transparency, and accountability.
III. Analyzing ICANN Transparency from an Information Law Perspective
Applying the Information Law Approach to ICANN
ICANN's continued existence and role as the technical coordinator of the DNS is premised on a series of agreements with the US Government, including the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and the Affirmation of Commitments (AoC). 36 Within these agreements, the government conditions ICANN's authority on explicit commitments to, inter alia, ensuring that policy decisions are made in the public interest that are accountable and transparent. These agreements are so fundamental to ICANN's existence that they can be regarded as a "constitutional framework" for the organization's internal policies and regulations. These agreements provide particularly explicit guidance 37 towards the creation and maintenance of ICANN's institutional policies relating to transparency, including policies reflected in the Articles of 479 36 ICANN, "Memorandum of Understanding", November 25, 1998, http://www.icann.org/en/general/icann-mou-25nov98.htm. The original agreement has been amended a number of times. A list of the amendments and other agreements with the Dept. of Commerce can be found at http://www.icann.org/en/general/agreements.htm. 37 Specifically, in Section 9.1 of the Affirmation of Commitments, ICANN is obligated to "maintain and improve robust mechanisms for public input, accountability, and transparency so as to ensure that the outcomes of its decision making will reflect the public interest and be accountable to all stakeholder." To meet these obligations, 41 Conducting a compliance analysis on ICANN's actual practices faces two problems. First, ICANN does not currently conduct an annual audit or review of its own transparency practices or make empirical information relating to its transparency practices available to the public. Because of this, there are no data points to evaluate ICANN's actual practices against its normative policies. Second, ICANN's "constitutional framework" adds certain dynamic elements into ICANN's normative policies. For instance, the AoC requires ICANN to continously assess and improve its normative policies to ensure they reflect robust mechanisms for transparency and accountability. Additionally, ICANN is required to be open to, and in some cases solicit, the advice of the US government as well as the GAC. In turn, these dynamic elements open additional channels of influences on ICANN's normative policies. 42 In sum, due to the political character of the environment in which ICANN operates, and the lack of adequate empirical data, any compliance analysis has to be preceded by a normative analysis to ensure that ICANN's normative policies themselves are an adequate interpretation of its "constitutional framework." The compliance analysis then -due to a lack of adequate empirical data -has to rely mainly on "appearances" such as the material provided on ICANN's website. Consequently, the Information Law analysis will proceed by identifying normative standards in environments analogous to ICANN, then identify ICANN's relevant normative policies, and conclude with an assessment of ICANN's normative policies and actual practices, to the extent that the latter can be determined. These assessments will be birfurcated into ICANN's distinct modes of transparency: (1) "active transparency practices," which are ICANN's policies/practices related to proactive information dissemination, and (2) "passive transparency practices," which are
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ICANN's policies/practices related to providing access to information that is not proactively disseminated. 43
The Normative Standards for ICANN's Transparency a) Analogous Public Sector Role Models
The normative framework provided in the MOU, the AoC, and by observations in the GAC, suggest that ICANN's rules and practices take guidance from analogous publicsector models. ICANN, however, is structured as a private-sector corporation. As such, ICANN is not subject to US federal or state access-to-government information 39 43 This memorandum excludes information policies relating to transparency in the "consultation processes" (involving the general public in ICANN's decision making) -and which may be addressed as "participatory transparency" -from this analysis since they fall outside the scope of transparency and would require a more detailed analysis of ICANN's decision making processes. For more information on the concepts of "active", "passive", and "participatory" transparency modes, see Berkman Report (note 30), 12-16; ICANN, "Accountability and Review TeamAnnouncements", November 3, 2010, http://www.icann.org/en/announcements/announcement-2-regulations, like the Freedom of Information Act. 44 However, public sector developments in the area of transparency may provide valid normative role models. Looking internationally, we can also note changes in the private sector: South Africa's freedom of information legislation for example has been the first to lay down information disclosure obligations on private-sector entities under certain conditions. 45 The expansion of freedom of information legislation to entities in the private sector has caused companies to create and maintain active information policies in order to be prepared for information requests that seek access to information via a government institution where relevant information has been deposited. 46 Semi-public international organizations like the World Bank or the Asian Development Bank have also adopted similar comprehensive information policies. 47 481 b) Normative Synthesis and Analysis: "Ground Rules"
As to the substance of such transparency rules insight can be gained from international regional instruments on access to government information, e.g., Council of Europe documents, 48 as well as from institutional and procedural changes in the European Union, 49 or initiatives in Canada 50 and the US 51 to revitalize freedom of information regulations by implementing experiences from electronic democracy and electronic government initiatives.
After taking into account ICANN's unique nature and operating environment, a set of basic "ground rules" emerge which function as guideposts that reflect normative standards for relevant policies and practices in the field of transparency. 52 In general, these ground rules require that the transparency policies themselves are transparent to those who should benefit from them -meaning, that they are published to an easily accessible location, and that they are written in clear and understandable manner.
44 ICANN's current corporate form as a non-profit California corporation excludes it from being the requirements in The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), which generally applies to US agencies and other enumerated authorities of the United States government. 5 U.S.C. § § 551, 552 These procedures should address how information requests can be made (passive transparency), and ensure that the procedures explain how responses to such requests are issued, including the specific timeline in which a response will be issued.
Responses should be issued to every request and either release the requested information or explain why the information cannot be released. Considering ICANN's technical role, and the current best practices of website design, ICANN should have a well organized, user-friendly means of communicating information through its website.
In light of ICANN's international involvement, language should not limit the community's ability to submit information requests or receive information disclosures.
Formalized procedures should be in place that ensure a regular review and assessment of the substantive transparency policies and actual practices. Such a review of internal information management procedures and practices ensure dilligent corporate governance and that the organization remains accountable to its stated policies. All decisions by ICANN should be subject to a review mechanism to ensure that high quality decisions are being made and to strengthen the legitimacy of such decisions to the public. Such a review 482 mechanism should be institutionalized; and, at a minimum, ICANN should publish publicly-accesible records to demonstrate how such procedures are being handled.
The substantive rules relating to the conditions under which information will be released or withheld (under the "conditions of non-disclosure") should be clearly formulated. These rules should also differentiate conditions of disclosure and nondisclosure according to the risks associated with disclosure of the information. For example, these conditions might include circumstances where corporate legal duties, the privacy interests of individuals, or confidential information (e.g., trade secrets) obligates ICANN to withold the disclosure of information. Furthermore, these conditions should not be absolute; rather, they should be open to weighing public interests against risks of disclosure on a case-by-case basis. When the circumstances merit nondisclosure of a part less than the whole, information suitable for disclosure should be released in part.
IV. Assessment of Normative Policies and Actual Practices 1. ICANN's Active Transparency
According to its information policies ICANN proactively publishes "a comprehensive set of materials" that are considered to be of key importance for the ICANN process, including:
Annual Reports Material information relating to the Security and Stability Advisory Committee 53 According to the DIDP, ICANN makes this material accessible to the public "in due course." Although the DIDP does not actually specify the availability of translations related to the publications of these materials, ICANN does have a general policy that states a commitment to "translat[ing] core strategic and business documentation" into UN languages and to "work collaboratively with the community and experts to develop tools for multi-lingual dialogue." 54 The active publication of an organization's operative material does meet international standards in terms of current practices as well as in terms of desirable future developments. 55 In this case ICANN's own rules are in accordance with the normative framework in which it operates. However, three additional issues remain problematic, the first two are normative issues that relate to the timing of making such material available (i.e., unclear definition of "due course") and the lack of an audit to monitor the actual practices against ICANN's stated policies. The third issue relates more to the method by which ICANN makes this material available; this is primarily an issue of compliance.
The term "due course" is too general to provide sufficient guidance for an active information disclosure policy. This issue is also compounded by the lack of oversight and the way by which information is being made available. Since there is no easy way for the user to compare the date of finalization with the date of publication, and ICANN does not have an independent audit in place, there is no sufficient incentive to keep the "due course" due. 56 ICANN's DIDP does not reference a yearly audit of its transparency practices. Such audits are -as we pointed out above -part of the standard practices for ensuring transparency in the public sector. Even where there is no specific oversight agency, there are at least administrative audits the results of which are publicly available. 57 The absence of such a policy is even more surprising because following the One World Trust review in 2007, ICANN had committed itself to such an audit. 58 ICANN's most recently published Annual Report does not reference such an audit. 59 Finally, the way in which active information duties are being delivered does not contribute to the overall commitment of transparency. While this is primarily an issue of information design, the role of usability should not to be underestimated. Transparency is not merely about the sequential presentation of documents; rather, transparency comprises many functions which need to be addressed by an adequate information design. Transparency may, for example, aim at providing structural information (relating to processes and structures of the organization in question), topical information (relating to the issues at stake in the information handling, decision-making and presentation processes), decision-making information proper (relating to the way decisions are being made in different specific procedures), or contextual information (relating to the criteria of decision making and the information used for decision making as well as information relating to the persons and institutions and other relevant context elements involved in decision making). Adequate information design should take these functional considerations into account. Moreover, ICANN has also acknowledged the design problem. In July 2006, ICANN announced plans to make its website more user friendly. 60 Two years later in 2009, a usability survey conducted by ICANN lead to a full redesign plan which, notably, remains unexecuted. 61 When measured against the normative standards of active transparency, ICANN lacks an appropriate oversight procedure and a meaningful timeline for actively disclosing certain information. As to compliance the informational design of these information provisions needs to become more orientated towards the various functions of transparency.
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ICANN's Passive Transparency
In contrast to ICANN's active transparency policies, both the procedural description and timeline for dealing with passive information requests are much less ambiguous. 62 This procedure, however, suffers from two normative problems. 57 See e.g., US Office of Management and Budget, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/. Since the completion of this memorandum, it was brought to the Berkman team's attention that ICANN has begun implementing some design changes on the website. However, it remains unknown if these changes reflect those described in the redesign plan.
62 "If a member of the public requests information not already publicly available, ICANN will respond, to the extent feasible, to reasonable requests within 30 calendar days of receipt of the request. If that time frame will not be met, ICANN will inform the requester in writing as to when a response will be provided, setting forth the reasons necessary for the extension of time to respond. If ICANN denies the information request, it will provide a written statement to the requestor identifying the reasons for the denial." AT Frameworks and Principles, 2008, 10 f.
First, while the procedure is described, it is very difficult for the average user to become aware of the existence of this procedure and of what it entails. Ultimately, we believe that this is an issue that affects the basic existence of such an access right and not a mere issue of compliance or information design.
Second, based on wording of the "appeal" procedures, it appears that the appeal mechanisms may not be available to denied requestors in every circumstance. The DIDP states that a requestor may appeal the denial through the Reconsideration Request procedures or Independent Review procedures to the extent applicable. 63 Upon closer look, the wording of these procedures is not only ambiguous, but also raises questions concerning their actual availability as a remedy since they both impose threshold requirements. 64 Similar to active transparency, the lack of a prescribed audit or oversight procedure is a serious normative fault for passive transparency. Furthermore, the lack of a clearly and appropriately designed review procedure for information refusals also poses a normative fault.
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The Disclosure Exemption Policy
ICANN's information disclosure exemptions give rise to a normative problem that affects both active and passive transparency. The exemptions apply both to the decision on which information is being made proactively published to ICANN's website and to information that is the subject of a submitted request.
The exemptions are identified in the DIDP as a "set of conditions for the nondisclosure of information." In practical terms, these exemptions highlight certain types of information, occasionally coupled with attendant circumstances, which ICANN will not make available to a member of the public, by way of an information request or other means. For example, the exemptions exclude the disclosure of: trade secrets, information related to health, life or safety, information subject to legal disclosure requirements, and information relating to the security and stability of the Internet, or information where an expectation of privacy of confidentiality is typically expected.
In conformity with the "ground rules," many of these exemptions protect such categories of information that we find protected in most access-toinformation legislative enactments. However, two exempted categories are somewhat troubling because of their broad formulation: commercial and financial information not publicly 63 AT Frameworks and Principles, 2008, 10 (emphasis supplied). 64 According to the Bylaws, Reconsideration Requests may be submitted by a person or entity which has been "materially affected by an action of ICANN."ICANN Bylaws, Article IV, Section 2, ¶1. The following paragraph in this section states that "[a]ny person or entity may submit a request for reconsideration or review of an ICANN action or inaction ("Reconsideration Request") to the extent that he, she, or it have been adversely affected by:" either (a) "staff actions or inactions that contradict established ICANN policy(ies); or" (b) "one or more actions or inactions of the ICANN Board that have been taken or refused to be taken without consideration of material information[.]" ICANN Bylaws, Article IV, Section 2, ¶2 (emphasis supplied). It is unclear if the phrase "adversely affected by" as opposed to "materially affected" is intended to distinguish or establish threshold standing requirements for persons submitting Reconsideration Requests. In addition to ambiguity in the Bylaw description of the Reconsideration Request, the Independent Review procedure provides a separate process by which "any person materially affected by a [Board] action or inaction", which he or she believes to be "inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws", to submit a Request for an "independent third-party review" of those actions or inactions. ICANN Bylaws, Article IV, Section 3, ¶ ¶1, 2. The threshold requirement for submitting a request for an Independent Review requires that a violation of the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws occur as a result of a Board action or inaction. However, the DIDP does not indicate how the Board is involved with a DIDP request.
disclosed by ICANN, 65 and information requests which are a disturbance. 66 Also, some of the other exemption categories are somewhat broadly worded in their formulations and, in contrast to the highly sophisticated exemptions in the Canada's Access to Information Act, 67 there are no weighing mechanisms to balance the public interest in disclosure against those protected interests.
The exemption policy does not entirely prohibit the disclosure of information that falls within the enumerated categories. The policy contains a specific "override provision" that information subject to an exemption "may still be made public if ICANN determines, under the particular circumstances, that the public interest in disclosing the information outweighs the harm that may be caused by such a disclosure." 68 This catch-all clause implies that in each application of exemption category ICANN is required to make such a balance assessment. This override would thus have a similar function as the tests included in many of the access to government information laws. By the same token, the policy also includes a provision whereby ICANN may exempt the "disclosure of information under circumstances not designated [within the 487 policy] if ICANN determines that the harm in disclosing the information outweighs the public interest in disclosing the information." 69 This sort of override, with which ICANN reserves final authority to withhold information even when none of the exemptions apply, questions the purpose of formulating exemption policies altogether.
Summary
In applying the Information Law approach to ICANN's active and passive transparency policies and practices we identified both normative problems and compliance problems. The normative problems create a tension between the normative policy directives in which ICANN operates and the guidance it has formulated for itself. These tension points relate to the absence of appropriate audit/oversight mechanisms for active and passive transparency, the ambiguity of a review procedure in case of refused access requests, and most important of all the unprecedented and unacceptable possibility to override all specific exemptions of information disclosure. Compliance problems, in as far as they are discernable at all due to the lack of sufficient audit material, mainly relate to the information design of ICANN's interface with the general public. 77 Finally, the Directors should be selected so as to ensure the broadest cultural and geographic diversity on the Board consistent with meeting the other selection criteria mentioned above. 78 In order to guarantee broad international representation, each geographic region must have at least one but no more than five Directors at all times. 79 These criteria fall into different categories: some are of an individual nature (e.g., integrity, commitment and understanding of ICANN's mission), while others are of a collective nature (e.g., cultural and geographic diversity and familiarity with ICANN topics); some can be verified rather easily (e.g., willingness to serve as volunteers, language skills, geographic diversity), while others require difficult subjective assessments (e.g., being open-minded and sufficiently familiar with ICANN's activities and the Board's topics).
V. Transparency in
Improving the decision making of its Board is probably one of the greatest challenges ICANN will have to meet in the near future. From an Information Law perspective, two key issues can be identified: the transparency of the selection process with regard to the expertise and skills of potential Board members, and the transparency of the Board's decision making as such.
Current Issues a) Transparency of Selection Process
The ICANN Bylaws provide for both a diverse set of selection criteria 80 and a complex process for the selection of Board members with no less than six different selecting bodies for the voting Directors and five different bodies for the non-voting liaisons. 81 The interplay of these two factors leads to significant difficulties in selecting an appropriately composed Board.
Since different bodies select Directors who have to meet both individual and collective criteria, and as some of these criteria are much easier to assess than others, the selecting bodies tend to focus on individual and easily verifiable criteria rather than on those to be fulfilled collectively which are harder to assess. As a consequence, the expertise and skills of the Board members and their familiarity with ICANN topics tend to have less impact on the selection process than other criteria such as language skills and geographic diversity which are either individual, easy to verify or both.
The de facto preferences of the selecting bodies for some of the selection criteria are, however, neither provided for by ICANN's Bylaws nor are they usually transparent. Rather, they are an unintended consequence of the complex structure of the selection process and the diversity of the selection criteria. As a result, it may sometimes remain unclear for third parties why certain candidates were selected and others not. In addition and above all, the hidden preferences of the selecting bodies tend to undermine the aggregate management skills and technical expertise represented on the Board. accessible. 84 With regard to its policy development and decision-making process, 85 ICANN's Bylaws explicitly state that "ICANN and its constituent bodies shall operate to the maximum extent feasible in an open and transparent manner and consistent with procedures designed to ensure fairness." 86 As these principles also apply to the Board, ICANN has adopted various measures to promote transparency of the Board's decision making: the minutes of the Board meetings are published on the website, 87 non-confidential sections of Board briefing materials are published, 88 and a wiki provides easily accessible information on every substantive resolution approved by the Board. 89 In addition, ICANN is committed to responding, to the extent feasible, to requests for information not publicly available provided that the request is reasonable and not subject to specific conditions for nondisclosure. 90 Despite these various attempts, the Board's decision making still lacks transparency.
b) Transparency of Decision Making
Since the minutes of the Board meetings neither capture the full basis for a decision nor provide sufficient detail and adequate explanations, the logic used to arrive at a final decision often remains unclear. Altogether, the transparency of the decision-making process often has a formal, rather than substantive, appearance.
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Possible Solutions
As to the process of selecting Board members, three options to increase transparency should be considered. First and most obviously, the selecting bodies must always be provided with comprehensive information on the skills and expertise of all candidates. Second, the selecting bodies should establish an informal ranking of the selection criteria stating that management skills, technical expertise, and familiarity with the ICANN topics are of paramount importance. Third, the selecting bodies should set up a mechanism for identifying the collective skill set required, 91 and provide for informal exchange between the bodies which enables them to pre-assess whether the nominees fulfill the respective requirements, at least in the aggregate.
The transparency of the Board's decision making should be improved by providing detailed explanations of the rationale for all decisions adopted including explanations of other proposals considered (e.g., alternatives proposed to an adopted resolution) and rationale for their rejection. In the long run, bottom-up policy making relying on broad public participation can only be ensured if third parties are given the opportunity to understand why the Board has decided in one way or the other. 92 Therefore, the information published by the Board should also reveal to what extent expert opinion and community input have been considered. 93
VI. Transparency in Practice II: Public Participation
As noted in Section I, ICANN's commitment to broad-based community and stakeholder engagement in its decision-making processes are embedded in its DNA; these values are enshrined in its founding principles, reiterated by the AoC, and embodied in the multitude of solicitations, channels, and opportunities made available for public comment and input. 94 However, despite marked improvements and targeted efforts to improve ICANN's public participation 492 processes, 95 there is still the perception among many ICANN stakeholder groups that their inputs are not reflected in the final decisions of the Board. 96 Critics point to deficits in ICANN's capacity to truly receive, respond to, and demonstrate the manner in which it effectively and visibly incorporates the views of the broader community in its decision-making processes. 97 Issues related to opaqueness -regarding how the staff interprets public comments, for example, or how the Board actually digests and incorporates those inputs -translate into skepticism regarding the "meaningfulness" of public contributions and the possibility of truly bottom-up approaches on a global scale.
The volume of information can also be a factor -too much information, too many comment periods, an overwhelming number of simultaneous invitations to participate. Public participation barriers can also be exacerbated by the complexity 98 of ICANN's organizational structure, or other "bureaucratic" hurdles, which may translate into a lack of consistency in how public inputs are structured across different bodies or a slow pace in how such inputs ultimately reach the Board.
Despite different bases for these observations, each of them center on a critical question: does ICANN's commitment to "participatory evangelism" translate into a guise of broad stakeholder influence into ICANN decisions, rather than true impact? 99 Within the context of this article, we are primarily concerned with the role of transparency in facilitating or undermining public participation mechanisms and trajectories, and therefore, in how ICANN decisions are received and perceived as legitimate by its community members. As numerous scholars have noted, transparency is only one tool that can enhance the efficacy of public participation processes. In order to be effective, it must be combined with other ICANN efforts to ensure the ability of
